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to the macula. And if this is true, it must follow that the power of space discrimination of the retina can be neither more nor less accurate than these eye movements (or their corresponding innervations) which are made in order to bring the stimulation of any excentric point on to the fovea. But Dodge and Cline have already called attention to certain errors in the immediate fixation of excentric visual stimuli. The author, therefore, proposes to compare the size of such errors in movement with the spacial discrimination of the same excentric points, that is, their threshold for twoness and their threshold for least perceptible movement.

Dr. Dearborn finds that both these threshold discriminations are always much finer than is the ability to move the eye so as to bring an excentric stimulation on to the fovea. Thus in one subject the error of movement in bringing the stimulation of a certain excentric point on to the fovea was 1° 48′, whereas the threshold for twoness at that same excentric point was between 28′ and 41′, and the threshold for perceiving movement was but very little over 5′. The results are, therefore, adverse to the Lotzean hypothesis.

This is a careful and thoroughly intelligent piece of work. It is to be remarked, however, that we have here the same difficult problem which has come up in the experiments of Müller and Schumann on lifted weights, —that of the relation between the idea (reproduced muscle sensation, feeling of innervaton, or whatever it may be) which precedes the movement, and the muscle sensations which later report what the movement has actually been. Also the fact that the threshold for twoness on any excentric region is so different from the threshold of perceived movement on the same region, shows that the situation is otherwise exceedingly complicated. Doubtless, however, Dr. Dearborn is amply justified in concluding that the Lotzean hypothesis in its primitive form does not adequately explain the facts.

EDWIN B. HOLT.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. JOHN WATSON. *Philosophical Review,* January and March, 1904, pp. 1–15, 143–158.

In these two articles, Professor Watson has given an abstract of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics,* a work which, he says, 'has had an influence upon the history of human thought out of all proportion to its length.' In what it aims to do, the abstract is admirably successful, presenting concisely and with perfect clearness what in the original is not open to systematic interpretation except for careful reading. Apart from their excellence as an abstract, the two papers, if we mistake not, would seem to be a kind of sign of the philosophical times in America; for the fact that articles which, instead of being commentary for Aristotelian scholars, pretend to be nothing more than a barest outline of the *Posterior Analytics,* should appear in a leading American philosophical journal, seems to point to a widespread lack of first-hand knowledge of Aristotle's treatise. Professor Watson's articles are timely if this inference is justifiable, and they should be effective in helping to 'revive' the *Analytics* on this side of the water.

The abstract is especially excellent in its right proportioning of Aristotle's treatment of the deductive and inductive phases of demonstrative reasoning. Without arguing the point, that is, merely by a faithful reproduction of the thought of the *Analytics,* Professor Watson shows how fundamental for Aristotle induction was, and yet how, for him, it never could be the completing process in scientific knowledge. Science is the knowledge of the cause or ground (*τὸ διότι*). Induction can only, at best, present us with the fact of invariable concomitance; it can not itself pass to the causal conclusion of 'absolute invariability,' to *τὸ καθόλου* in the strictest sense. Thus it merely supplies the material for the intuitive causal conclusion of reason (*νοῦς*). As such, however, it is indispensable. How the transition is made from the bare presentation of invariable concomitance to causal concomitance is a question that Aristotle answers by the doubtless unsatisfactory appeal to *νοῦς*. Professor Watson, in one of his very few comments, says in this regard: "Though it can hardly be denied that the transition from invariable concomitance to absolute invariability is hard to justify, it must be said, in defense of Aristotle, that his doctrine is based upon the principle that nature is not a sphere in which pure contingency prevails, but is on the whole subject to law. This, indeed, is a presupposition for which Aristotle can supply no adequate justification; but granting its truth, it is natural to suppose that when by induction we have discovered certain invariable conjunctions, the mind is able to seize upon the universal principle which these conjunctions suggest." No doubt the Aristotelian theory of *νοῦς* as, in its knowledge of primary principles, a *ἕξις*, or capacity, is unsatisfactory because of its utter vagueness, yet it marks the important effort made by Aristotle to give due weight not only to the empirical processes but also to the obvious, and indeed logically necessary, intuitional grasp of principles. Professor Watson gives a very excellent summary of Aristotle's rather obscure account of definition, as well as of his important distinction of the various meanings of universality, and of his much-discussed last chapter of the treatise. In reading these articles, one wishes that Professor Watson had not, in order to make his work more easily effective, passed so lightly over difficulties of interpretation and theory with which the *Analytics* are replete. But perhaps the sacrifice of detail to the emphatic outlining of the whole must here be allowed justifiable.

H. A. OVERSTREET.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Article Section. May, 1904. Vol. XI., No. 3. *The Law of Attraction in Relation to Some Visual and Tactual Illusions* (pp. 143–178): HAYWOOD J. PEARCE. – Quantitative study of an illusion similar to that of Müller-Lyer: the apparent length of a straight line is increased by the presence of secondary straight lines